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Abstract
In this paper, from the excess utility function we obtain a binary relation in the social
weights space and then, for an inﬁnite dimensional economy, we prove the existence of equi-
librium, in our approach we don’t suppose the existence of a demand function. Finally, we
obtain a condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium, and we give some examples of economies
that satisfy this condition.
Introduction
In this paper without assuming the existence of the demand function, we prove from the excess
utility function an existence of equilibrium theorem, and we obtain a condition to uniqueness of
equilibrium. The introduction of the excess utility function, allow us to transform an inﬁnite
dimensional problem in a ﬁnite dimensional case.
In the ﬁrst section we characterize the model, and we introduce some standard deﬁnition in
general equilibrium theory. In the second section we introduce the excess utility function and
we show some of its properties. In the third section from the excess utility function we prove
that there exists a bijective relation between the equilibrium allocations set and the set of zeros
of excess utility function. In the fourth part from the excess utility function we obtain a binary
relation in the social weights space, we prove that the equilibrium set is not empty. Our main
tool is the Knaster, Kuratowski, Masurkiewicz lemma.
In the next section we deﬁne from the excess utility function the weak axiom of the revealed
preference. So deﬁned, this axiom, is only formally similar with the classic one. It has the same
mathematical properties that the classic axiom of revealed preference but it has not the same
economical interpretation. We prove that if the excess utility function has this property then
uniqueness of equilibrium follows, that is there exists only one zero for this function. Finally
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useful comments.
1examples of economies with weak axiom of revealed preference in the excess utility function are
giving.
1 The Model
Let us consider a pure exchange economy with n agents and l goods at each state of the world.
The set of states is a measure space : (Ω,A,ν).
We assume that each agent has the same consumption space, M = Πl
j=1Mj where Mj is
the space of all positive measurable functions deﬁned on (Ω,A,ν).
Let be Rl
++ = {x ∈ Rl with all components positives}.
Following [MC] we consider the space Λ of the C2 utility functions on Rl
++, strictly monotone,
diﬀerentiably strictly concave and proper.
Deﬁnition 1 A C2 utility function u is diﬀerentiably strictly convex, if it is strictly convex and
every point is regular; that is the gaussian curvature, Cx of each level surface of u, is a non null
function in each x.
For x,y ∈ Rl we will write x > y if xi ≥ yi i = 1...l and x 6= y.
Deﬁnition 2 A utility function is strictly monotone if x > y ⇒ u(x) > u(y).
Deﬁnition 3 We say that u ∈ C2 is proper if the limit of |u0(x)| is inﬁnite, when x approach to
the boundary of Rl
++, i.e: the set B = {x : xi = 0 for some i = 1,...,n}.
We will consider the space U of all measurable functions U : Ω × Rl
++ → R, such that
U(s,·) ∈ Λ for each s ∈ Ω.
We introduce the uniform convergence in this space: Un → U if kUn − UkK → 0 for any
compact K ⊂ Rl






|Un(s,z) − U(s,z)| + |∂Un(s,z) − ∂U(s,z)| + |∂2Un(s,z) − ∂2U(s,z)|
o
.
Each agent is characterized by his utility function ui and by his endowment wi ∈ M.
From now on we will work with economies with the following characteristics:





Ui(s,x(s))dν(s) i = 1,...,n (1)
where Ui : Ω × Rl
++ → R and Ui(s,·) is for each agent his utility function at every state
s ∈ Ω.
2b) The utility functions Ui(s,.) belongs to a ﬁxed compact subset of Λ, for each s ∈ Ω and
Ui ∈ U.
c) The agents’ endowments, wi ∈ M are bounded above and bounded away from zero in any
component, i.e. there exists, h and ¸ al H with h < wij(s) < H for each j = 1...l, and s ∈ Ω.
The following deﬁnitions are standard.





Deﬁnition 5 A commodity price system is a measurable function p : Ω → Rl
++, and for any
z ∈ Rl we denote by hp,zi the real number
R
Ω p(s)z(s)dν(s). (We are not using any speciﬁc symbol
for the euclidean inner product in Rl.)
Deﬁnition 6 The pair (p,x) is an equilibrium if:
i) p is a commodity price system and x is an al location,
ii) hp,xii ≤ hp,wii < ∞ ∀ i ∈ {1,...,n}







Ui(s,z(s))dν(s) ∀ i ∈ {1,...,n}.
2 The Excess Utility Function
In order to obtain our results we introduce the excess utility function.
We begin by writing the following well known proposition:




there exists ¯ x(λ) = {¯ x1(λ),···, ¯ xn(λ)} ∈ Rln








i wi and xi ≥ 0.
(2)
If Ui depend also on s ∈ Ω, and Ui(s,·) ∈ Λ for each s ∈ Ω, and λ ∈ 4n−1, there exists








i wi(s) and xi(s) ≥ 0.
(3)
3If γj(s,λ) are the Lagrange multipliers of the problem (3), j ∈ {1,...l}, then from the ﬁrst
order conditions we have that
λi
∂Ui(s,x(s,λ))
∂xj = γj(s,λ) with i ∈ {1,...,n} and j ∈ {1,...,l}
Then the following identities hold
λi∂Ui(s,x(s,λ)) = γ(s,λ) ∀i = 1,...,n ; and ∀s ∈ Ω. (4)
Remark 1 From the Inada condition of “inﬁnite marginal utility” at zero (Deﬁnition 3), the
solution of (3) must be strictly positive almost everywhere. Since U(s,.) is a monotone function,
we can deduce that
Pn
i=1 ¯ xi(s) =
Pn
i=1 wi(s).
Let us now deﬁne the excess utility function.
Deﬁnition 7 Let xi(s,λ);i ∈ {1,...,n} be a solution of (3).






γ(s,λ)[xi(s,λ) − wi(s)]dν(s), i = 1,...,n. (5)
is the excess utility function.
Lemma 1 The excess utility function is bounded for above, that is, there exists k ∈ R such that
e(λ) ≤ k1, where 1 is a vector with all its components equal to 1.





From the concavity of Ui it follows that:























Remark 2 Since the solution of (3) is homogeneous of degree zero: i.e, ¯ x(s,λ) = ¯ x(s,αλ) for
any α > 0, then we can consider ei deﬁned all over Rn
++ by ei(αλ) = ei(λ) for all λ ∈ ∆n−1
++ .
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i wi(s) and xi(s) ≥ 0.
(6)
Is a well known proposition that for an allocation ¯ x, is Pareto optimal if and only if we can
choose a ¯ λ, such that ¯ x solves the above problem, with λ = ¯ λ. Moreover, since a consumer with
zero social weight receive nothing of value at a solution of this problem, we have that if ¯ x is a
strictly positive allocation, that is {¯ x ∈ Rl
++}, all consumption has a positive social weight. See
for instance [Ke]. Reciprocally if ¯ λ is in the interior of the simplex, then from remark (1) the
solution x(.,λ) of (6) is a strictly positive Pareto optimal allocation. (This is guaranteed also by
the following boundary condition on preference: {v(s) ∈ Rl
++ : v(s) i wi(s)} is closed for a.e.s,
for all i and wi(s) strictly positive.)
From the ﬁrst theorem of welfare, we have that every equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Let (¯ x) be an equilibrium allocation, then there exists a ¯ λ such that ¯ x = { ¯ x1,..., ¯ xn} : Ω → Rn,
is a solution for the problem in the beginning of this section.
In the conditions of our model, the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are the same that for
(3). Then if a pair (¯ p, ¯ x) is an price-allocation equilibrium, there exists a ¯ λ such that ¯ x(s) = ¯ x(s, ¯ λ);
solves (6) and ¯ p(s) = γ(s, ¯ λ) , solves (4) for a.e.s.
Moreover we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A pair (¯ p, ¯ x) is an equilibrium, if and if there exists ¯ λ ∈ 4n−1 such that ¯ x(s) =
¯ x(s, ¯ λ); solves (6), and ¯ p(s) = γ(s, ¯ λ) , solves (4) for a.e.s and e(¯ λ) = 0.
Proof: Suppose that ¯ x(·, ¯ λ) solves (6) and γ(s, ¯ λ) solves (4). If for ¯ λ ∈ 4n−1, we have that
e(¯ λ) = 0, then the pair (¯ p, ¯ x), with ¯ p = γ(·, ¯ λ) and ¯ x = x(·, ¯ λ), is an equilibrium.
Reciprocally, if (¯ p, ¯ x) is an equilibrium, then is straightforward from deﬁnition that e(λ) = 0.
From de ﬁrst welfare theorem, there exists ¯ λ ∈ 4n−1, such that ¯ x is a solution for (6). Since p is a
equilibrium price, it is a support for ¯ x, i.e. if for some x we have that ui(x) ≥ ui(¯ x),i = {1,...,n},
strictly for some i then h¯ p,xii > h¯ p,wii and from the ﬁrst order conditions we have that: ¯ p(s) =
γ(s). The proposition is proved.
Let be 4n−1
++ = {λ ∈ 4n−1 : λi > 0 ∀ i = 1,···,n}.
We will now the deﬁnition of the equilibrium set.
Deﬁnition 8 We will say that λ is an equilibrium for the economy if λ ∈ E, where E = {λ ∈
4n−1
++ : e(λ) = 0}. The set E will be called, the equilibrium set of the economy.
54 A Binary Relation In The Social Weights Space
Let e : Rn → Rn be a excess utility function.
Let us deﬁne  in ¯ 4n−1
 = {λ ∈ Rn
+ :
Pn
i=1 λi = 1;λi ≥ } a subset of the social weights space.
Deﬁnition 9 We deﬁne  as:
(λ1,λ2) ∈ iff λ1e(λ2) < 0.
We will write λ1  λ2.
Properties of the Binary Relation .
 is irreﬂexive, convex, and upper semi-continuous.
• irreﬂexive λ 6 λ because λ.e(λ) = 0.
• convex if λ1  λ and λ2  λ, then α λ1 + β λ2  λ with α + β = 1.
• upper semi-continuous, A = {α ∈ 4n−1
 ; λ  α} is open
Proof:
A = {α ∈ 4n−1
 ; λ.e(α) < 0},
by the continuity of λ.e(.), exist an open neighborhood Vα of α, such that λ.e(Vα) < 0.
Then A is open.
5 Existence of Equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 10 We say that γ is a maximal element of  if there does not exist λ such that a
λ  γ.
Lemma 2 The set of maximal elements in ¯ 4n−1
 is non-empty.
Proof: Note that
F(λ) = ¯ 4n−1
 − {α ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 such that λ  α} = {α ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 such that λ.e(α) ≥ 0}
is a compact set.
We can also see that the convex hull of {λ1,···,λk} is contained in ∪k
i=1F(λi) for all ﬁnite
subset λ1,···,λk ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 . To this end let be λ1,...,λk ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 . If γ =
Pk
i=1 aiλi is a convex
6combination and γ is not in ∪k
i=1F(λi), then λi  γ for every i = 1,...,n, and so, since  is
convex value, we must have γ  γ. This is not possible because  is irreﬂexive.
Then from Fann-Theorem, (see for instance [BC]) it follows that ∩λ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 F(λ) 6= ∅. It is easy
to see that the set of maximal elements in ¯ 4n−1
 is equal to ∩λ∈ ¯ 4n−1
 F(λ).
Then the theorem follows.
Theorem 1 Let E be an economy with inﬁnite dimensional consumption space, with diﬀerentiable
strictly convex C2 and separable utilities. Then E has a non-empty, compact set of equilibrium.
Proof: From lemma 2 we know that there exists γn a maximal element in ¯ 4n−1
n . The collection
{¯ 4n−1
n } may be directed by inclusion. Consider n → 0, and γn ∈ ¯ 4n−1
n ⊂ ¯ 4n−1, since ¯ 4n−1
is a compact set, there exists γ ∈ ¯ 4n−1 = {λ ∈ Rn
+
Pn
i=1 λi = 1} and a subnet {γ0
n} such that
γ0
n → γ. If we prove that: γ ∈ 4n−1
++ = {λ ∈ ¯ 4n−1,and λ >> 0} and that e(γ) = 0, then the
theorem follows. Suppose that γ ∈ ∂ ¯ 4n−1 = {λ ∈ ¯ 4n−1and at least one λi = 0 i ∈ {1,···,n}}.
Is straightforward from the deﬁnition that limλ→∂ ¯ 4n−1 ke(λ)k = ∞ since e is bounded above,
see lemma 2), then there exists ξ ∈ 4n−1
++ and 0 such that ξe(γ
00) < 0,∀
00







0 ≤ 0, the last inequality contradicts the maximality of γ
00.
Suppose now there exists a ei(γ) < 0 i = {1,···,n,} then for same ξ ∈ 4n−1
++ we have that
ξe(γ) < 0. From the continuity of ξe(·) we obtain that ξe(γ0
0) < 0,∀0
0 > 0, this contradicts the
maximality of γ0
0. Then e(γ) ≥ 0 follows. Since γ ∈ S and γe(γ) = 0, then e(γ) = 0.
The theorem is proved.
Then the set E = {λ : e(λ) = 0} is non empty. That is, there exists at least one equilibrium
(x(s,λ),p(s,λ)) for E. .
6 Uniqueness From W.A.R.P.
Let us now to deﬁne the weak axiom of revealed preference (W.A.R.P.) from the excess utility
function.
Deﬁnition 11 We say that the excess utility function satisﬁes the weak axiom of revealed prefer-
ence (WARP) if
λ1.e(λ2) ≥ 0 then λ2.e(λ1) < 0
Theorem 2 WARP implies uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proof: We argue by contradiction. Suppose that λ1 and λ2 are two equilibria.
7From Proposition 6) we have that e(λ1) = e(λ2) = 0.
Then λie(λj) = 0, thus W.A.R.P. yield the following inequality λje(λi) < 0,i = {1,2},j =
{1,2}.
Uniqueness follows.
Deﬁnition 12 Let e be a excess utility function, then e is monotone on Tλ = {¯ λ ∈ Rn : ¯ λλ = 0}
if (λ1 − λ2)(e(λ1) − e(λ2)) > 0, whenever (λ1 − λ2) ∈ Tλ,e(λ1) 6= (λ2).
Proposition 3 If (e(·)) is a monotone function, e(·) has W.A.R.P.
Proof: Suppose that λ2e(λ1) ≥ 0. Since λiλ > 0;i = 1,2, there exists α > 0 such that
λ1−αλ2 ∈ Tλ. Hence (λ1−αλ2)(e(λ1)−e(αλ2)) > 0, follows, and then −λ1e(αλ2) > αλ2e(λ1) ≥ 0.
Since e is a homogeneous degree zero function, λ1e(λ2) < 0. We have concluded our proof.
6.1 Some Applications
Proposition 4 If the central planner chooses λ using the rule , and if the excess utility function
has WARP, then the λ selected by the central planner is an equilibrium.
From WARP we have that ¯ λe(λ) < 0. That is ¯ λ  λ.
Economies with WARP in the Excess Utility Function
Example 1 Suppose an economy with the following utility functions:
Ui(x) = x(s)
1
2, endowments w1(s) = as and w2(s) = (1 − a)s, with 0 < a < 1,s ∈ (0,1)
and µ the Lebesgue mesure.













2 (x2 − w2)dµ(s)









Substituing in the above equation we obtain that:
















Is ease to see that :
¯ λe(λ) < 0 ∀ λ, i.e. ¯ λ  λ.
Example 2 For economies with utilities Ui(x) = Lgx,i = (1,2) we obtain WARP in the excess
utility function.
87 Concluding Remarks.
In economies with inﬁnite dimensional consumption spaces, the agent’s budget may not be com-
pact. Hence the existence of demand function need not be a consequence of the utility maxi-
mization problem. In our approach without assuming its existence, with a simple proof, we have
obtained the existence of the competitive equilibrium. So the excess utility function appears as
a powerful tool in order to obtain a deeper insight in the structure of the equilibrium set. Some
additional assumptions about the behavior of the excess utility function allow us to obtain a
suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium. Unfortunately its economical
interpretations are not straightforward.
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